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Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.:
Illinois Reexamines Medical
Device Preemption
ADRIAN S. ALLEN*
INTRODUCTION
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,' the Supreme Court took up the subject of federal
preemption of state common-law tort claims against the manufacturers of medical
devices. The Supreme Court's decision to take the case was motivated in part by the
division among the circuit courts as to what benefits the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 ("MDA")3 conferred upon medical device manufacturers who
followed the requirements of the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA")
premarket approval ("PMA") process.4 The importance of the issue was indicated by
the number of parties that joined in the dispute over whether compliance with the
PMA process should allow the preemption of state common-law tort claims.5
However, the Supreme Court's resolution of the case failed to definitively resolve the
issue and left several other issues open.6 The issue of the preemptive result of
compliance with the PMA process upon state common-law tort claims continues to
splinter the circuits and divide federal and state courts.7
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1. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
2. Id. at 474.
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379-379a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
4. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 484.
5. Westlaw has links to seventeen briefs by amidi curiae. Amici curiae on behalf of the
petitioner included, for example, Brief ofAnicus Curiae General Motors Corp.,Lohr(Nos. 95-
754,95-886), 1996 WL 109601, and Brief ofthe American Insurance Ass'n et al., Lohr (Nos.
95-754, 95-886), 1996 WL 109605. Amici curiae on behalf of the respondent included, for
example, Brief of the State of Florida et al., Lohr (Nos. 95-754, 95-886), 1996 WL 109592,
BriefAnicus Curiae of the State of California, Lohr(Nos. 95-754,95-886), 1996 WL 109599,
and Brief Amici Curiae of American Ass'n of Retired Persons et al., Lohr (Nos. 95-754, 95-
886), 1996 WL 109611.
6. See Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1371 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting
that while Lohr can be regarded as holding that compliance with the section 510(k) process did
not preempt state common-law claims, it left open the issue of whether compliance with the
PMA process would preempt state common-law claims).
7. Compare id. at 1382 (holdingthattheMDAdidnotpreemptcommon-lawclaims under
Florida law for negligent design and strict products liability), In re Orthopedic Bone Screw
Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817,823 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the MDA would not disallow
any viable state law claim of fraudulent misrepresentation), and Haidak v. Collagen Corp., 67
F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that PMA of collagen products under the MDA
did not preempt plaintiffs claims), with Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902,911-13 (7th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the PMA process preempted most state common-law claims with
limited exceptions), and Heymach v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 698 N.Y.S.2d 837, 840-42
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (refusing to follow precedent of the appellate court in finding that a
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Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.,' a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Illinois, is indicative of this state of affairs. In overruling a decision that
PMA did not preempt any state common-law tort claims, the court in Weiland stated
that in reference to the contrary decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., "we believe, the case from the Seventh Circuit was
wrongly decided."9 The divergence of the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of
Illinois, as an example of the conflicting court decisions on this issue, indicates the
need for the U.S. Supreme Court to reexamine the issue of PMA of medical devices
and subsequent preemption of state common-law tort claims in order to bring order
and some predictability to the issue.
This Note will examine the development of the law interpreting the preemptive
effect of compliance with the PMA process upon state common-law claims and
discuss the divergence between the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Part I of this Note will set out the development of federal regulation in the area of
medical devices leading up to the enactment of the MDA. Part H will explain the
PMA process by which the FDA initially evaluates the safety of medical devices
before they are allowed onto the market for public use. Part III will discuss Lohr, the
main Supreme Court decision addressing the preemption of state common-law claims
against medical device manufacturers. Part IV examines the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of Lohr. Part V discusses the recent Supreme Court of Illinois decision
in Weiland and notes the conflict between the Supreme Court of Illinois and the
Seventh Circuit on the issue of preemption of state common-law claims by
compliance with PMA requirements.
I. ENACTMENT OF THE MDA
Traditionally, individual states have been the main protectors of their citizens'
health and safety.'" However, from the early part of the twentieth century Congress
has displayed an increasing readiness to enact legislation to protect consumers from
potentially harmful medical drugs and medical devices. The first major piece of
congressional legislation was the Food and Drugs Act of 1906," which constituted
"a broad prohibition against the manufacture or shipment in interstate commerce of
any adulterated or misbranded food or drug."'" However, the Food and Drugs Act of
1906 did not contain any provision for the regulation of medical devices. 3
manufacturer's compliance with the PMA process did not preempt state common-law claims).
8. 721 N.E.2d 1149 (IlI. 1999).
9. Id. at 1154.
10. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996). The Court noted that the
"[s]tates traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons." Id. (citing Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)).
11. Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915,34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938,21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
12. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475 (citing Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768).
13. S. REP. No. 94-33, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1071. See
generally Dennis R. Johnson, The History of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act and the Meat
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The absence of any provision for the regulation of medical devices was remedied
by the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 193 8 ("FDCA").14
FDCA "broadened the coverage of the 1906 Actto include misbranded or adulterated
medical devices and cosmetics." 5 This regulation was superior to the 1906 Act in that
it allowed for the PMA of drugs. 6 PMA was not extended to medical devices."7 At
the time of FDCA's passage, Congress's major concern was the improper labeling
of medical devices 8 as "legitimate devices were relativelysimple items which applied
basic scientific concepts so that experts using them could recognize whether the
device was functioning."' 9 The FDA turned its attention to the "hazards from
legitimate medical devices around 1960.""2 This change in focus was a result of the
rapid developments in the medical device industry following World War II that
included inventions such as "heart pacemakers, kidney dialysis units, and artificial
blood vessels and heart valves."' The increased reliance on medical devices led to
increasing consumer and regulatory concern. These concerns led Congress to enact
the MDA 2 to protect the "[i]ncreasing numbers of patients [who] have been exposed
to increasingly complex devices which pose serious risk if inadequately tested or
improperly designed or used."'24
The MDA greatly strengthened the regulation of medical devices by giving the
FDA the proactive power to review medical devices for safety and effectiveness
before they entered the market.2" Congress was mindful that it did not want to erect
Inspection Act, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 5 (1982).
14. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
15. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475 (citing Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 §§ 501-
502, 21 U.S.C. §§ 350b-351 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
16. Id.
17. Id.; S. REP. No. 94-33, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1072.
18. S. REP. No. 94-33, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1072.
19. Id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1072.
20. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1074.
21. Id.
22. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475-76. The Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine contraceptive device, is
an example of the types of medical devices that were causing some groups to call for greater
regulation of the medical device industry. Id. "Touted as a safe and effective contraceptive, the
Dalkon Shield resulted in a disturbingly high percentage of inadvertent pregnancies, serious
infections, and even, in a few cases, death." Id. at 476 (citing Bruce A. Finck, The Effectiveness
of FDA Medical Device Regulation, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 293, 297-301 (1974)); see also
Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption andMedicalDevices: The CourtsRun Amok,
59 Mo. L. REV. 895, 911 n.83 (1994) (discussing the importance of the Cooper Committee,
created by the Department of Health, Education & Welfare, in convincing Congress to enact
medical device legislation).
23. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379-379a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
24. S. REP.No. 94-33, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1075. For further discussion
of the MDA, see Mary G. Boguslaski, Classification and Performance Standards Under the
1976 Medical Device Amendments, 40 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 421 (1985).
25. Adler& Mann, supra note 22, at 910-11; Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr. & Robert E. Durgin,
Medtronic v. Lohr: Is There a Future for Preemption in Medical Device Cases?, 64 DEF.
2001)
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regulatory barriers so burdensome that they would discourage the development of
medical devices that would benefit society. 6
The MDA breaks down medical devices into three main classes for regulatory
purposes: class I devices, class II devices, and class III devices.27 The FDA devised
this system so that devices that posed potentially greater harm to the consumer would
receive greater regulatory scrutiny.2"
A. Class IDevices
A device can qualify as a class I device in two ways." The first method can be
accomplished by showing that another section of the MDA is "sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device."'3 Alternatively,
a device can qualify for class I certification if it "is not purported or represented to
be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial
importance in preventing impairment of human health"31 and "does not present a
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury."32
Class I devices are thus "[d]evices ... subject only to minimal regulation by
'general controls."' 33 Devices that have been classified in class I include surgeon's
gloves," eye pads,35 and ice bags. 6
CouNs. J. 45, 46 (1997).
26. S. REp. No. 94-33, at2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1071 ("[A]s research makes
new breakthroughs, an increasing number ofsophisticated, critically important medical devices
are being developed and used in the United States .... The Committee wants to encourage their
research and development.'); see also Scott W. Sayler & Steven M. Thomas, Post-Decision
Diagnosis: Medical Device Preemption Alive and Mostly Well After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 185, 186-87 (1997).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1994).
28. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,476-77 (1996); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-
Squibb Co., 103 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 1996); Adler & Mann, supra note 22, at 911-14;
Anne-Marie Dega, TheBattleoverMedicalDeviceRegulation: Do theFederalMedicalDevice
Amendments Preempt State Tort Law Claims?, 27 Loy. U. CfI. L.J. 615, 626 (1996).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
30. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i). For applicable sections, see 21 U.S.C. § 351 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) ("Adulterated drugs and devices"); id. § 352 ("Misbranded drugs and devices"); 21
U.S.C. § 360f(1994) ("Banned devices"); 21 U.S.C. § 360i (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ("Records
and reports on devices"); id. § 360j ("General provisions respecting control ofdevices intended
for human use").
31. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (1994).
32. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
33. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 476-77. "General controls relate to adulteration, misbranding,
registration, premarket notification, good manufacturing practices, and reporting." Adler &
Mann, supra note 22, at 913 n.88.
34. 21 C.F.R. § 878.4460 (2000).
35. Id. § 878.4440.
36. Id. § 880.6050.
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B. Class II Devices
Class II devices are those for which "the general controls by themselves are
insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the
device.""' In addition, there mustbe enough "information to establish special controls
... including the promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance,
patient registries, development and dissemination of guidelines.. . recommendations,
and other appropriate actions as the Secretary deems necessary."'3 For any class H
devices that are "represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life,"
the Secretary must identify, examine, and provide assurance of any special controls
"necessary to provide adequate assurance of the [device's] safety." '39 The FDA has
classified tampons," syringes," and neonatal incubators' as class I1 devices.
C. Class III Devices
Class III devices are those that either "'presen[t] a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury' or which are 'purported or represented to be for a use in supporting
or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing
impairment of human health."' 43 The FDA has classified pacemakers" and heart
valves4" as class HI devices. Manufacturers of class HI devices cannot market them
unless they assure the FDA of the device's safety and effectiveness by compliance
with the PMA process.'
H. THE PMA PRocEss
The PMA process has been described as rigorous."' A "[m]anufacturer[] must
submit detailed information regarding the safety and efficacy of their devices, which
the FDA then reviews, spending an average of 1200 hours on each submission.
' 48
37. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 21 C.F.R. § 884.5460. The FDA has taken the further step of requiring tampon
manufacturers to followspecific labelingrequirements andto conduct specific absorbencytests
upon their products. Id. § 801.430. The specific labeling requirements have been held to
preempt state common-law claims for failure to warn. Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737,
738 (9th Cir. 1997).
41. 21 C.F.R. § 880.5860.
42. Id. § 880.5400.
43. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,477(1996) (quoting21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)).
44. 21 C.F.R § 870.3610.
45. Id. § 870.3925.
46. 21 U.S.C. § 360e (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For further discussion of the MDA
classification scheme, see Adler & Mann, supra note 22, at 912-15.
47. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477.
48. Id. (quoting Medical Devices and Drug Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 384 (1987)
(statement of Rep. Benson, Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health, Food, and
Drug Admin., Dep't of Health and Human Servs.)).
2001]
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The submitted information must include: a report on all information (published or
which should reasonably be known to the applicant) that would show the device's
safety and effectiveness; 49 a statement of the device's components, ingredients, and
principles of operation;' and a description of the facilities and quality controls
involved in manufacturing, processing, packaging, and/or installing the device." In
addition, the manufacturer may be required either to furnish a sample directly to the
FDA or make a sample available for inspection at its place of business, if
practicable,52 and furnish examples of the labels intended for use with the device.53
The Secretary can augment these requirements with requests for more information if
a determination is made that it is necessary.' Obviously, the full PMA process can
be extremely expensive for manufacturers.55 Therefore, manufacturers have not
hesitated to take advantage of the available exceptions to the full PMA process.'
A. Exceptions to the PMA Process
There are two exceptions to the PMA process. The first exception addresses the
problem of what should be done with devices that were already on the market when
the MDA was enacted. Obviously, it would have been impractical to withdraw those
devices, so the FDA approved "a 'grandfathering' provision which allow[ed] pre-
1976 devices to remain on the market without FDA approval until such time as the
FDA initiates and completes the requisite PMA." The FDA then turned to the
49. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A) (1994).
50. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(B).
51. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(C).
52. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(E).
53. Id. § 360e(c)(l)(F).
54. Id. § 360e(c)(1)(G).
55. See David A. Kessler et al., The FederalRegulation ofMedicalDevices, 317 NEwENG.
J. MED. 357, 359 (1987).
56. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477-80 (1996) (noting that "[n]ot all, nor
even most, Class III devices on the market today have received premarket approval because of
two important exceptions to the PMA requirement"); Adler & Mann, supra note 22, at 914
n.98 (noting that in "1986, for example, 4,338 devices reached the market through the '510(k)'
route while only 72 devices did so through the PMA process" (citing Medical Devices and
Drug Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't ofthe House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 384 (1987) (statement of Rep. Benson, Deputy Dir., Ctr.
for Devices and Radiological Health, Food, and Drug Admin., Dep't of Health and Human
Servs.))). Putting a medical device through the full PMA process can cost from $111,000 to
$828,000, while the exceptions cost from $50 to $2000. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d
1367, 1369 n. I (11 th Cir. 1999) (citing Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1345 n. 14(11 th
Cir. 1995), affd in part and rev'd in part, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)). InLohr, the Supreme Court
noted that '"[t]he attraction of substantial equivalence to manufacturers is clear. [Section]
510(k) notification requires little information, rarely elicits a negative response from the FDA,
and gets processed very quickly."' Lohr, 518 U.S. at 479 (second alteration in original)
(quoting Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction
Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 516 (1988)).
57. Lohr, 518 U.S. at478 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A), and21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1)
(2000)).
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problem of what to do to "prevent manufacturers of grandfathered devices from
monopolizing the market while new devices clear the PMA hurdle."58
In order to deal with this problem, the FDA allowed devices "that are 'substantially
equivalent' to pre-existing devices to avoid the PMA process."59 Medical device
manufacturers who seek to meet MDA requirements in this fashion musi submit a
premarket notification or 510(k) notification to the FDA.' An FDA finding that the
proposed device is substantially equivalent to an existing device allows the device to
be marketed without having to go through the entire PMA process.6
B. Preemption of State Common-Law Claims
The major dispute in the field of medical device liability is the preemptive effect
that courts should give to compliance with the PMA process.62 This necessitates an
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B)); see also Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d
902,905 (7th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090,1095-96 (6th
Cir. 1997); Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 103 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1997); Dunlap v. Medtronic
Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Milkiewicz v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 963
F. Supp. 1150, 1152 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
60. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478.
61. Id. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (2000) ("When a premarket notification
submission is required."); id. § 807.85 ("Exemption from premarket notification."); id. §
897.87 ("Information required in apremarket notification submission."); id. § 807.90 ("Format
of a premarket notification submission."); id. § 807.100 ("FDA action on a premarket
notification."). Congress has authorized a third exception to the PMA process for devices for
investigational use. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 21 C.F.R. § 812.
Investigation has been defined as "research involving one or more subjects to determine the
safety or effectiveness of a device." 21 C.F.R. § 812.3(h). This exception was approved in
order "to encourage, to the extent consistent with the protection of the public health and safety
and with ethical standards, the discovery and development of useful devices intended for
human use and to that end to maintain optimum freedom for scientific investigators in their
pursuit of that purpose." 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(1) (1994). The FDA will not approve an
application for an investigational device exception ("IDE") if "the risks to the subjects are not
outweighed by the anticipated benefits to the subjects and the importance of the knowledge to
be gained, or informed consent is inadequate, or the investigation is scientifically unsound, or
there is reason to believe that the device as used is ineffective." 21 C.F.R. § 812.30(b)(4). See
generally Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 109 F.3d 1243, 1245 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the
IDE exception); Martin, 105 F.3d at 1095 (same); Lewis v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., 19
F. Supp. 2d 625, 627 (E.D. La. 1998) (noting that the FDA developed rules governing IDEs
in general and for intraocular lenses in particular). For a more detailed discussion of the IDE
exception, see Stephen D. Harris, Preemption of State Tort Claims Under the Medical
Device Amendments, 24 COLO. LAW. 2217,2219 (1995); Sayler & Thomas, supra note 26, at
204-06.
62. A number of courts have held that a manufacturer's compliance with the PMA process
preempts state common-law claims. E.g., Richman v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 988 F. Supp.
753, 758-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that state-law claims alleging that a manufacturer was
negligent, careless, and reckless in manufacturing, design, construction, labeling, packaging,
distribution, and sale of ligament were preempted by the MDA); Kozma v. Medtronic, Inc.,
925 F. Supp. 602, 605-06 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that compliance with the PMA process
2001]
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examination of the actual clause upon which manufacturers and courts have based
their claims that compliance with the PMA process forestalls state common-law tort
claims, which is contained in § 360k:
State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General Rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement-
(I) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.'
preempted claims of defective design, failure to warn, and breach of implied warranties);
Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (noting
that in approving a product through the PMA process, the FDA imposed federal requirements
specific to that device preempting state common-law claims); Mears v. Marshall, 944 P.2d 984,
993 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) ("Without question, [the PMA process completed by Zyderm]
established requirements that governed nearly every aspect ofZyderm's commercial existence,
[therefore preempting state common-law claims]."); Fry v. Allergen Med. Optics, 695 A.2d
511,514-17 (R.I. 1997) (concluding that the PMA process imposed strict federal requirements
on a manufacturer and therefore that state common-law claims were preempted); Wutzke v.
Schwaegler, 940 P.2d 1386, 1391 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("The general consensus is that the
rigorous process of the PMA results in approval of a device's design that rises to the level of
specific federal requirements.").
Other courts have held that compliance with the PMA process does not preempt state
common-law claims. E.g., Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965 F. Supp. 49,54 (D.D.C. 1997)
("The fact that the PMA process requires certain information and mandates certain procedures
from manufacturers does not transform the PMA process itself into a specific federal
requirement which triggers preemption and protects a manufacturer from suit." (emphasis in
original)); Comeau v. Heller, 945F. Supp. 7, 12 (D. Mass. 1996) ("The Supreme Court was
well aware ofthe distinction between a PMA-approved device and a § 510(k)-approved device
yet it failed to limit theMedtronic holding to the latter."); Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision
Prods., Inc., 552 N.W.2d 679,684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (disagreeing with "most federal and
state courts that have considered similar arguments [and] have concluded that the [PMA]
process satisfies the FDA's preemption rule and preempts state common law claims"); Sowell
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 656 N.Y.S.2d 16, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (stating that "while a
PMA review is considerably more rigorous and detailed than the premarket notification at issue
in Medtronic," it does not preempt state common-law claims).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). Subsection (b) allows a state or one of its political subdivisions
to apply for an exception to preemption when compelling local conditions require a more
stringent requirement:
(b) Exempt requirements
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the Secretary
may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral hearing,
exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under such conditions as may be
prescribed in such regulation, a requirement ofsuch State orpolitical subdivision
applicable to a device intended for human use if-
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this chapter
which would be applicable to the device if an exemption were not in effect under
[Vol. 76:443
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The above provision further necessitates an inquiry into federal preemption doctrine.
Federal preemption of state law is based upon the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
Preemption of state law has been described as "complicated and not readily
predictable. It is.. . a matter of statutory interpretation and is highly text-specific,
turning on the language, structure and purpose of the federal regulatory scheme at
issue. Precedent decided under one statute must therefore be used with caution when
interpreting a different statute."65 The Lohr Court noted that in interpreting § 360kwe
should be "informed by two presumptions about the nature of preemption."' First,
because of the states' historic preeminence in regulating the health and safety of their
citizens, "we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."'" Second, "'[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone' in everypre-emption case. .As a result, any understanding ofthe scope
of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on 'a fair understanding of congressional
purpose.'
69
The MDA is an example of express preemption.70 Express preemption occurs
"when Congress explicitly provides language indicating that it wishes state laws to
be displaced."7' However, as noted above, 2 even with explicit preemptive language,
"interpreting congressional intent remains the key challenge since the 'purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in determining preemption."73
this subsection; or
(2) the requirement-
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be in
violation of any applicable requirement under this chapter.
Id. § 360k(b).
64. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
65. William W. Schwarzer, Federal Preemption-a BriefAnalysis, in 2 CIVIL PRACTICE
AND LIGATIONIN FEDERALAND STATE COURTS § H-6, at 1 (Sol Schreiber et al. eds., 8th ed.
1998).
66. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.
67. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
68. Id. (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963) (alteration in original)).
69. Id. at 485-86 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 530 n.27 (1992)).
70. Id. at 484.
71. Adler & Mann, supra note 22, at 900.
72. See supra text accompanying note 69.
73. Adler & Mann, supra note 22, at 900 (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625
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One of the major decisions in developing the concept of federal preemption of state
products liability laws was Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc.74 Cipollone involved the
interpretation of section 5(b) of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
of 1965 ("1965 Act")." Section 5(b) provided that "[n]o statement relating to
smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act."76 The Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") amended this section. 7 The
preemption clause was amended to read: "No requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising
or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this Act."78
Brought against a cigarette manufacturer, Cipollone involved five basic claims
under New Jersey law.79 For the purposes of this Note, we are most interested in how
the Court dealt with the plaintiff's claims for failure to warn based on the theories
that Ligget was negligent either in the manner in which it advertised cigarettes or for
its failure to provide adequate warnings regarding the consequences of smoking.8"
The Court held that "insofar as claims under either failure-to-warn theory require a
showing that respondents' post-1969 advertising or promotions should have included
additional, ormore clearly stated, warnings, those claims are preempted."'" The Court
stated that while the 1965 Act had preemptive force against state positive law but not
state common-law claims,' the 1969 Act did preempt certain state common-law tort
claims as a result of the changes Congress made in the statute's language.8" The Court
noted that "the later Act bars not simply 'statement[s]' but rather 'requirement[s] or
prohibition[s] ... imposed under State law""4 and that the "later Act reaches beyond
statements 'in the advertising' to obligations 'with respect to the advertising or
promotion' of cigarettes."8 5
The Court then refused to hold that common-law rules did not constitute a
v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
74. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
75. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. §1334(b)
(1994).
76. Id.
77. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
78. Id. The required warning was "WARNING: THE SURGEON GENERAL HAS
DETERMINED THAT SMOKING IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH." Cipollone, 505
U.S. at 508 (emphasis in original). This warning was later amended to a series of four rotating
warnings. Id. at 508 n. 1.
79. Id. at 509.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 524.
82. Id. at 519-20.
83. Id. at 520-31.
84. Id. at 520 (alterations in original) (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994)).
85. Id. (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C.
§1334(b) (1994), and Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1334
(1994), respectively).
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"requirement" under the 1969 Act.86 Rather, it said "'[n]o requirement or prohibition'
sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common
law." The Court went on to state "[a]s we noted in another context, '[state]
regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through
some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed
is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.'1
8 8
In justifying its position, the Court recapitulated that the presumption against
preemption obligated it to read the preemption statute narrowly.89 This required a
narrow reading of the statute's language to determine whether "the legal duty that is
the predicate of the common law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law with respect
to.. . advertising or promotion. "" Cipollone's resolution of the preemption issue
was recognized by the dissents as an unsatisfactory resolution of the matter.9
Beyond all the judicial rhetoric about the proper mode of analysis with which to
examine the 1969 Act, the proper approach is that of Justice Stevens.' He confronted
a statute that was explicit in preempting state requirements that conflicted with the
federal government's requirement for the labeling of cigarettes.93 From the plain
language of the statute, it can be easily inferred that common-law decisions finding
that cigarette companies were negligent in their compliance with federal requirements
would necessarily interfere with the federal requirement. Singling out a single aspect
of cigarette manufacturing for regulation, Congress preempted common-law claims
in that area, while leaving consumers with a variety of other state common-law claims
to fall back on such as breach of warranty," fraudulent misrepresentation,9" and
conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material facts concerning the health hazards of
smoking.96
In examining the application of the preemption doctrine to the medical device field,
we should be mindful of the essentially commonsense nature of Justice Stevens's
86. Id. at 521.
87. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 2,
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994)).
88. Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gamon, 359 U.S. 236,247 (1959)).
89. Id. at 523.
90. Id. at 524 (alteration in original) (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
§ 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994)).
91. See id. at 543-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in thejudgment in part,
and dissenting in part) ("I can only speculate as to the difficulty lower courts will encounter
in attempting to implement today's decision."); see also id. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with Justice Blackmun that the lower courts will have difficulty in implementing the
decision).
92. For further discussion of Cipollone, see Mary P. Benz & Derek J. Meyer, Express
FederalPreemption: Where Is It After Cipollone?, 59 DEF. COuNs. J. 491 (1992); Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Products Liability-Cigarettes and Cipollone: What's Left? What's Gone?, 53
LA. L. REV. 713 (1993); Michael D. Green, Cipollone Revisited: A Not So Little Secret About
the Scope of Cigarette Preemption, 82 IowA L. REv. 1251 (1997).
93. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
94. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 526-27.
95. Id. at 527-29.
96. Id. at 530-31.
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decision. As a matter of policy, courts should look for detailed congressional
consideration of an issue before they find that Congress intended to take people's
common-law rights away. Thus, Congress can either explicitly reserve an area of
regulation for itself as it did in the Airline Deregulation Ace7 or enact a statute that
.by its nature intimates that Congress desired the statute to be regulated exclusively
by Congress. The 1969 Act, which contains no explicit preemption of state common-
law claims, can be more reasonably seen in this regard as a measure that reserved the
field of cigarette labeling regulations to Congress.
The only Supreme Court decision dealing with the preemptive scope of the MDA
is Lohr.98 Lohr was originally tried in the Eleventh Circuit" and is informative
because it forms the basis for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mitchell"°0 and the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Weiland.'
III. MEDTRONIC, INC. . LOHR
In 1987, Lora Lohr received a Medtronic pacemaker equipped with a Model 4011
pacemaker lead."0 2 Three years after she received the pacemaker, it failed, the
occurrence of which necessitated emergency surgery.°3 After herphysician identified
the lead as the likely cause of the failure, Mr. and Mrs. Lohr filed suit in a Florida
state court.' They alleged both a negligence claim for failure to use reasonable care
in the design, manufacture, assembly, and sale of the pacemaker and a strict liability
claim asserting that the device was defective and. unreasonably dangerous to
foreseeable users."°5 Medtronic removed the case to federal court where it moved for
summaryjudgment based on the theory that all the Lohrs' claims were preempted by
the MDA. °6 After initially denying Medtronic's application for summary judgment,
the district court reviewed its finding in light of a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit and dismissed all the Lohrs' claims.0
The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, leading the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari because "the Courts of Appeals are divided over the extent
to which state common-law claims are pre-empted by the MDA."'' The pacemaker
at issue inLohr had been approved through section 510(k)'s expedited process, which
97. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(l) (1994) (preempting states from enforcing any"law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an
air carrier").
98. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
99. Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335 (11 th Cir. 1995), aff'd inpart and rev'd in part,
518 U.S. 470 (1996).
100. Mitchell v. Collagen, 126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997).
101. Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1149 (Ill. 1999).
102. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 480.
103. Id. at 480-81.
104. Id. at 481.
105. Id.
106. Id. Medtronic pointed specifically to 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994); see supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
107. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 482-83.
108. Id. at 484.
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permitted the approval of devices that were substantially equivalent to those on the
market."° This fact is of critical importance because it meant that the Court's holding
did not deal with devices that passed through the complete PMA process, leaving
courts to pore over Lohr's text to try to decipher how they should decide those
cases.
110
Lohr features a seven-part decision of which Justice Stevens announced the Court's
judgment and delivered the opinion of the Court with regard to parts 1, 11, 111, V, and
VII."' Stevens was joined in these parts by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and
Souter."' Justice Breyer did not join parts IV and VI, stating that he did not feel the
issue that part IV addressed was relevant, and that he did not agree with part VI's
contention that "future incidents ofMDA pre-emption of common law claims will be
'few' or 'rare."'1 3 Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas joined."'
Parts I and II are uncontroversial aspects of the Lohr case. Part I developed the
history of medical regulation, detailing the limitations ofprevious legislation and the
pressures that helped motivate Congress to enact the MDA." 5 In addition, it
examined the structure of the MDA, especially the abbreviated section 510(k) process
under which the Medtronic pacemaker was approved." 6 Part II reviewed the
procedural history of the case and introduced § 360k, under whichMedtronic claimed
that all state common-law claims asserted against it were preempted." 7
Part I set out the Court's basis for its analysis of preemption issues." The Court
reiterated its respect for the concept of federalism, declaring that state causes of
action should not be "cavalierly pre-empt[ed]" without a showing of the "'clear and
manifest purpose of Congress,"' and that this concern for the states' police powers
shouldbe used to "narrow[ly] interpreto" anysuch "invalidation ofstate law.""" The
109. Id. at 480; see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
110.
[TI]he Supreme Court's disposition of Lohr provides little more than a
rudimentary analytical framework to guide our resolution of Medtronic's
preemption claims in this court because Lohr involved the 510k process rather
than the PMA process, and because the Court fractured in an all but irreconcilable
manner over the extent to which section 360k(a) would ever preempt a general
state common law tort claim.
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1371 (11 th Cir. 1999).
111. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 474.
112. See id. at 474, 509.
113. Id. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting the
opinion of the Court in Lohr, 518 U.S. at 502).
114. Id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 475-80.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 480-84.
118. Id. at484-86.
119. Id. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947)) (noting
the objection of Justice Scalia that the presumption against the curtailment of the states' police
powers "should apply only to the question whether Congress intended any pre-emption at all,
as opposed to questions concerning the scope of its intended invalidation of state law"
(emphasis in original)).
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Court also noted that "understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest
primarily on 'a fair understanding of congressional purpose""'2 in addition to "the
language of the pre-emption statute and the 'statutory framework' surrounding it"'1
2
and "the 'structure and purpose of the statute as a whole.""'
Part IV of the opinion has no authority over lower courts because it only attracted
four votes." It does show, however, the position of four justices in that they rejected
Medtronic's argument that the plain language of § 360kpreempted any common-law
claims against a medical device manufacturer whose product had been approved."
Stevens's opinion stated that it was "'difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means ofjudicial recourse for those injured by illegal
conduct,""' especially since Congress decided the industry needed more "stringent
regulation."'2 6 Stevens supported this opinion by examining the MDA's legislative
history and finding no mention of any desire to exempt the medical device industry
from common-law duties." The Court sought to distinguish the definition of
"requirement" from its use in Cipollone, in which it was deemed to include state
common-law damage claims. '
In part V of the opinion, the Court examined the Lohrs' claims.'29 The Court
focused on the nature of the section 510(k) process. 30 The section 510(k) process
concentrates on whether a device is the equivalent of a pre-1976 device.' Because
this process did not place any requirements directing the pacemaker to "take any
particular form for any particular reason," there was no federal requirement as
required by § 360k to preempt state law.3 2 All nine justices supported this decision:
compliance with the abbreviated section 510(k) process would have no preemptive
effect upon state common law.' The remainder of part V clarified that a plaintiff
could sue to enforce compliance with the FDA's own requirements because that
"does not amount to the additional or different 'requirement' that is necessary under
[§ 360k]; ... rather, it merely provides another reason for manufacturers to comply
with identical existing 'requirements' under federal law."'34
Finally, under part V, the Court considered the Lohrs' claims for negligent
120. Id. at 485-86 (quoting Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,530 n.27 (1992)
(emphasis in original)).
121. Id. at 486 (quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
122. Id. (quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).
123. Id. at 474.
124. Id. at486-91.
125. Id. at 487 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at491.
128. Id. at 488-90.
129. Id. at 492-502.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 492-93.
132. Id. at 493-94.
133. Id. at 494-95, 513.
134. Id. at 495.
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manufacturing and labeling.'" This is a more interesting area since the section
510(k) process contains regulations governing labeling and "Good Manufacturing
Practices."'36 Stevens and Breyer looked to the FDA regulations that mandate that
"state requirements are pre-empted 'only' when the FDA has established 'specific
counterpart regulations or... other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device."'"37 The general requirements present under § 360k were held to be not
specific enough to constitute a federal requirement, and therefore the state common-
law claims were not preempted. '
Justice Stevens went on to state that general state law duties, such as using due care
to avoid foreseeable danger in products and "inform[ing] users and purchasers of
potentially dangerous items of the risks involved in their use," were not specifically
developed with regard to medical devices 39 Therefore, "their generality leaves them
outside the category of requirements that § 360k envisioned to be 'with respect to'
specific devices such as pacemakers."'"4 This language seems to be at odds with
Justice Breyer's concurrence even though he joined in part V. 4 Justice Breyer
evinced agreement with Justice O'Connor's opinion in which she stated that
common-law duties could easily be construed as requirements that would conflict
with the language of § 360k.'42 However, in explaining his position that state
common-law claims could sometimes be preempted, Breyer used an example that
featured an express MDA regulation requiring a particular device to have a particular
feature.'43 This is not identical to the general common-law duties that Justice Stevens
discussed above. The FDA has passed few measures that go to the detail of
prescribing what size wire a pacemaker should use.'" Instead, the MDA process tests
generally for a device's fitness for the marketplace and does not put any specific
requirements upon a particular device such as the regulation of the size of wires.'
Justice Breyer found further support for his position in the FDA's regulation
interpreting the preemptive scope of § 360k."*
135. Id. at 497-502.
136. Id. at 497.
137. Id. at 498 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2000)).
138. Id. at 501-02.
139. Id. at 501.
140. Id. at 502.
141. Id. at 503-08.
142. Id. at 503-04.
143. See id. at 504. Justice Breyer used the example of a federal MDA regulation with
respect to a particular hearing aid component that requires a two-inch wire. Id. He stated that
just as a state regulation that mandated a one-inch wire would be preempted so should a court
decision imposing a duty that involved the use of a one-inch wire. Id. Otherwise, allowing the
court decision to stand would result in an "anomalous result." Id.
144. One example of specific regulation is the condition that tampon labeling (a class II
device) adhere to the requirements set out by the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.430(d) (2000).
145. See Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1376-77 (1999). In discussing the
nature of the FDA regulations at issue in the PMA process, the Goodlin court stated that "the
restrictions Medtronic proffers in this case are entirely general in nature, and the FDA has not
promulgated them with respect to [a] 'particular device' ... or even with respect to the class
of specific devices at issue." Id. at 1377.
146. See 21 C.F.R § 808.1(d). The FDA's regulation provides:
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The importance of Breyer's position lies in the fact that any plaintiff seeking to
avoid preemption of their common-law claims must gain his vote in order to prevail.
Justice Breyer has signaled that he will find that a common-law action is preempted
if it conflicts directly with a particular PMA regulation on a particular device, thus
rejecting the position that a common-law cause of action can never be preempted by
§ 360k. 47
IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION OF LOHR
The Seventh Circuit discussed the preemptive effect of PMA compliance in
Mitchell. 141 In Mitchell, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered its previous holding that the
MDA preempted some of a plaintiff's state common-law claims. 149 The Supreme
Court had remanded Mitchell in light of its holding in Lohr. '
In the original trial, the Mitchells alleged various common-law claims including
strict liability, negligence, fraud, mislabeling, misbranding, adulteration, and breach
ofwarranty. '' The plaintiffhad developed serious medical complications after being
injected with a collagen-based product, classified as a class III medical device,
manufactured by the defendant.'52 The trial court granted summary judgment to
Collagen on the grounds that these claims were preempted by the MDA based on §
360k." The appellate court affirmed the trial court decision, although it based its
findings not only on the defendant's preemption defense but also on the basis that the
Mitchells had failed to produce enough evidence to defeat summaryjudgment.'
Upon reconsideration of the case following remand by the Supreme Court, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed its decision in Mitchell.55 The Seventh Circuit first noted
that Lohr involved a medical device that had not gone through the full PMA process,
but rather had gone through the abbreviated 510(k) process that was concerned with
whether a device was substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device.'56 Also, the
Seventh Circuit described Lohr as "contain[ing] several ambiguities that impair our
ability to perceive with absolute clarity the path that the Court has chosen for us to
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug
Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby
making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device
different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration
requirements.
Id.
147. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 502-03.
148. Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997), aff'g67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir.
1995).
149. Id. at 904.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 906.
152. Id. at 905.
153. Id. at 906.
154. Id. at 906-07.
155. Id. at 915.
156. Id. at 907.
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follow."'
157
In analyzing Lohr, the Mitchell court noted that four members of the Court would
find that general state common-law judgments could never be "requirements" as
mandated by the MDA's preemption statute while four other Justices concluded
explicitly that state common-law decisions were "requirements."' 58 The Seventh
Circuit then noted that "Justice Breyer supplied the determining vote in establishing
the Court's holding."'59 This determination is open to question since the Lohr Court
did not need to go beyond its conclusion that the abbreviated section 510(k) process
did not constitute a federal requirement in order to mike its decision. Therefore, the
language concerning § 360k was not necessary to the holding and should be
considered dicta, especially since Justice Breyer did not explicitly join the four
members of the Court who advanced that idea."6
However, JusticeBreyer's separate opinion does indicate he foundhimselfin basic
agreement with Justice O'Connor. 6 ' He qualifies this agreement by stating"[o]ne can
reasonably read the word 'requirement' as including the legal requirements that grow
out of the application, in particular circumstances, of a State's tort law."'6 The
language "inparticular circumstances" indicates that Justice Breyer thought that state
common-law judgments would not always preempt federal law. Breyer's refinement
of his position through his joining in part V of the Lohr decision 63 should be
interpreted as questioning the Mitchell decision that the PMA process can be
considered a federal requirement'" and supporting the conclusion of the Weiland
court that the PMA is not a federal requirement. 65 As discussed above, Justice
Breyer's interpretation can be read as resting on particular federal requirements for
a particular device rather than relying on the general PMA process.66
After concluding that state common-law claims could constitute requirements under
§ 360k, the Mitchell court then considered whether the PMA process couldbe termed
a requirement under § 360k. The Seventh Circuit distinguished the PMA process
from the abbreviated "substantially equivalent" process by "emphasiz[ing] that the
PMAprocess imposed requirements that directly affected the safety and effectiveness
of the product." 67 The FDA could be said to have "'weighed the competing interests
relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an unambiguous
conclusion about how those competing considerations should be resolved in a
particular case or set of cases, and implemented that conclusion via a specific
mandate on manufacturers or producers."" 68 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit
157. Id. at 910.
158. See id. at 908-11.
159. Id. at 908.
160. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 509-14 (1996) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. See id. at 503.
162. Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
163. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
164. See Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 911.
165. See Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (II. 1999).
166. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
167. Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 911.
168. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996)).
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concluded that the PMA process is a specific federal requirement and that
in order to determine whether a common law cause of action is preempted by the
action of the FDA, it is necessary to examine the state law cause of action at a
sufficiently precise level of generality to determine whether the final judgment
of the state court would impose on the manufacturer a burden incompatible with
the requirements imposed by the FDA.' 9
The Mitchell court then applied its findings to the claims before it, using the test
laid out in Lohr. Under § 360k, in order for a state common-law decision to be
preempted there needs to be "'a conflict between the state and federal regulations of
the medical devices which threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest." 17"
The Mitchells' claim for strict liability was held to be preempted because
"[a]pproval by the FDA constitutes approval of the product's design... [and] [a]
state court judgment premised on a contrary determination... would constitute...
a requirement 'different from, or in addition to,' the standard required by federal
authority."'' The court held that the Mitchells' negligence, mislabeling, misbranding,
fraudulent misrepresentation, implied warranty, and adulteration claims were
preempted for similar reasons. 72
In dismissing the Mitchells' claims, the Seventh Circuit did note that a complaint
that alleged that a manufacturer negligently adhered to the PMA process's standards
would not be preempted since a state court judgment to that effect "would not set up
a requirement 'different from or in addition to,' those established by the FDA....
[but rather] simply would enforce the standard embodied in the federal PMA."'' In
addition, the court noted that an express warranty claim created by the parties'
bargain would not necessarily interfere with the PMA process."4 The court does not
explain why a state court enforcement of an express warranty would not amount to
a different requirement than the PMA process.
In holding that state courts cannot enforce conditions "different from, or in
addition to" federal PMA requirements, it does not seem obvious why the Seventh
Circuit should allow state courts to have this exception. Certainly, the Mitchell court
provides no evidence in the form of legislative history to show that Congress intended
the MDA to preempt common-law claims unless manufacturers found it beneficial
to override that preemption. It may be that the Mitchell court saw express warranties
as a method to provide for some measure of consumer protection while protecting
manufacturers from most common-law torts. However, it does not seem reasonable
to believe that a patient in need of a pacemaker is going to be in a position to bargain
169. Id. at 912.
170. Id. at 913 (quoting Hemandez v. Coopervision, Inc., 691 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 913-15. In assessingthe claimforbreach of implied warranty, the courtstatedthat
"an implied warranty claim is based on the accepted standards of design and manufacture of
the products. In the case of a product that has gone through the PMA process, these criteria are
set by the FDA." Id. at 915. Therefore, if a court entered a judgment of breach of implied
warranty then it would be interfering with the PMA process. Id.
173. Id. at 914.
174. Seeid. at915.
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with a manufacturer in order to receive such assurances.
The U.S. Supreme Court should address, and the Seventh Circuit should
reexamine, the issue of whether the PMA process preempts state common-law claims.
At the federal level there is a split between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, 17 5 and
recently the Supreme Court of Illinois has stated that it believes the Mitchell decision
was "wrongly decided."'76 A discussion of the Weiland decision will show that it
comports better with congressional purpose and Justice Breyer's opinion in Lohr.
V. WEILAND V. TELECTRONICS PACING SYSTEMS, INC.
The plaintiffin Weiland alleged claims for breach of warranty and defective design
and manufacture against the manufacturer of two pacemakers he received in
subsequent operations. Both pacemakers were alleged to have malfunctioned,
causing Weiland to need surgery.'78 The trial court granted Telectronics summary
judgment on the grounds that § 360k preempted state claims that sought "'to impose
requirements on the manufacturer that relate to the safety and effectiveness of a class
III device that are different from and in addition to the requirements imposed by the
medical device amendment[s]." 79 On appeal, the court looked to Lohr, Mitchell, and
Kernats v. Smith Industries Medical Systems, Inc. ' for guidance. ''
The Illinois Appellate Court had previously stated in Kernats that "the PMA
process is a specific federal requirement."' However, Kernats also held that "[t]he
[Lohr] Court held that common-law claims challenging the manufacturing and
labeling of medical devices were not preempted by the MDA because they were
simply 'general obligations' imposed by the state on manufacturers; they were not
state requirements specifically developed 'with respect to' medical devices."'83 After
an extensive discussion of Mitchell and the relevant case law, the Weiland court
overruled Kernats on the issue of whether state common-law claims constituted
requirements under § 360k." While the Illinois Appellate Court recounted a
sweeping number of cases holding that state common-law claims should be treated
as requirements for § 360k purposes, it did not give much of a normative reason for
choosing to overrule Kernats. The court did, however, state that the "decisions of the
Federal courts interpreting a Federal act" are binding on Illinois courts to ensure that
175. Compare id. (holding that PMA approval is a specific requirement for preemptive
purposes), with Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367 (1 th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
PMA process does not constitute a federal requirement).
176. Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (111. 1999).
177. Id. at 1150-51.
178. Id.
179. Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 704 N.E.2d 854, 855 (Iil. App. Ct. 1998),
aff'd, 721 N.E.2d 1149 (111. 1999).
180. 669 N.E.2d 1300 (111. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 634 (Il. 1996).
181. See Weiland, 704 N.E.2d at 855-56.
182. Kernats, 669 N.E.2d at 1308.
183. Id. at 1309 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501-02 (1996)).
184. Weiland, 704 N.E.2d at 861 ("We disagree, however, with the Kernats court as to
whether the state law claims create requirements different from or in addition to the federal
requirements so as to find preemption.").
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the act is uniformly applied."8 5
The Illinois Supreme Court approached the issue of state common-law preemption
by first stating that "for a federal 'requirement' to have preemptive effect under
section 360k... it must be a specific requirement which applies to a particular
device and focuses on the safety and effectiveness of that device.'' 16 While the court
did accept that the PMA process related to a device's safety and effectiveness, it did
not accept that the PMA process imposed a federal requirement. 7 Weiland stated
that PMA signifies "'only a finding that the manufacturer's proposal to market a
device has reasonably assured the FDA of the device's safety and effectiveness."""
This is similar to the point made by the Eleventh Circuit in Goodlin that "[t]he PMA
process permits the FDA to regulate the introduction and sale of medical devices to
assure their minimal safety for public consumption-it does not appear to address the
appropriate standards of liability once the product enters the marketplace."'8 9
Furthermore, "[t]he design of the pacemakers at issue in this case originated solely
with the manufacturer of the device, not the FDA. The FDA did not require the
pacemakers to take any particular form for any particular reason."'' " The Weiland
court then stated that preemption would occur where the "FDA determines that
particular design or manufacturing specifications for pacemakers are warranted."''
It is obvious that the Weiland court has interpreted Justice Breyer's concurrence in
Lohr to mandate that a federal requirement be specific to a particular device in order
for preemption to occur. This is indicated by the use of an example similar to that
used by Justice Breyer in Lohr. The Weiland example indicated that "if the FDA
promulgated a rule requiring all manufacturers to use ceramic insulators for
pacemakers, section 360k would preempt plaintiffs claim in this case that
[Telectronics's] pacemakers were defective because ceramic insulators are
susceptible to cracking."'9 The Weiland court concluded its opinion by holding that
"the FDA's premarket approval of a Class M medical device does not establish a
specific federal requirement which preempts plaintiff's state common law claims."'
The holding of Weiland indicates a split between the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Illinois Supreme Court. This ongoing disagreement concerning
whether the PMA process should be treated as a "requirement" for preemptive
185. Id. (quoting Busch v. Graphics Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 403 (I11. 1996)). The
Illinois Supreme Court addressed this position in its opinion:
This court need not follow Seventh Circuit precedent interpreting a federal statute
where, as here, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question presented, there
is a split of authority among the federal circuit courts of appeals, and, we believe,
the case from the Seventh Circuit was wrongly decided.
Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (Il. 1999).
186. Id. at 1151 (emphasis in original).
187. See id. at 1152.
188. Id. (quoting Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1375 (1 1th Cir. 1999)).
189. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1378 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
190. Weiland, 721 N.E.2d at 1152.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
193. Weiland, 721 N.E.2d at 1153.
194. Id.
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purposes needs to be addressed by the Court. The Weiland court is correct in its
interpretation of Justice Breyer's position in Lohr.'95 In addition, Goodlin sets out
sound reasons to support a finding that the PMA process does not constitute a federal
requirement absent a showing of a particular regulation of aparticular device. 96 The
most notable reason set out in Goodlin was the lack of remedies available to
consumers if the preemption defense was allowed to stand. 97 As the court noted:
Reading the PMA process to impose specific federal requirements that enjoy
preemptive effect under section 360k, therefore, would deprive all persons
suffering injury as a result of a defective device-the very class of persons that
Congress intended to protect by enacting the MDA--of "most, ifnot all relief." 9
8
The court concluded that "'[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal
conduct....
CONCLUSION
There is no need to leave consumers without anyjudicial recourse. Justice Breyer
pointed the way to a resolution of the issue in his Lohr concurrence. The PMA
process should only have preemptive effect when it imposes a specific regulation
upon a specific device, for example, such as when the FDA requires tampons to be
labeled in a specific manner. In this regard, the public can be assured that preemption
of common-law claims is being traded for the sake of detailed regulation of a
particular device, rather than for compliance with a program that only assures
minimal public safety. The U.S. Supreme Court should revisit the issue of MDA
preemption and look to the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of Illinois, rather
than the Seventh Circuit for its guidance.
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
196. See Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1378-81 (11 th Cir. 1999). The court
noted that the MDA's legislative history indicated a congressional desire to provide extra
protection to consumers by promoting regulation before a device entered the marketplace. See
id. at 1378. This congressional desire was consistent with reducing the regulatory burden on
manufacturers before they entered the marketplace. Id. Goodlin also remarked upon the fact
that the medical device industry did not attempt to assert the preemption defense until fifteen
years after the passage of the MDA. The court found it unlikely that "the industry would have
ignored its immunity under the MDA for so long after the statute's enactment if Congress, in
fact, had intended to provide immunity in 1976." Id. at 1381.
197. See id. at 1379.
198. Id.
199. Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
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